another correlationism

copy/paste from: HALL, DAVID L. and ROGER T. AMES (1998). Chinese philosophy. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved June 24, 2011, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/G001SECT2

The dominance of correlative thinking

Rational or logical thinking, grounded in analytic, dialectical and analogical argumentation, stresses the explanatory power of physical causation. In contrast, Chinese thinking depends upon a species of analogy which may be called ‘correlative thinking’. Correlative thinking, as it is found both in classical Chinese ‘cosmologies’ (the Yijing (Book of Changes), Daoism, the Yin–Yang school) and, less importantly, among the classical Greeks involves the association of image or concept-clusters related by meaningful disposition rather than physical causation. Correlative thinking is a species of spontaneous thinking grounded in informal and ad hoc analogical procedures presupposing both association and differentiation. The regulative element in this modality of thinking is shared patterns of culture and tradition rather than common assumptions about causal necessity.

The relative indifference of correlative thinking to logical analysis means that the ambiguity, vagueness and incoherence associable with images and metaphors are carried over into the more formal elements of thought. In fact, the chaotic factor in the underdetermined correlative order has a positive value as an opportunity for personalization and self-construal. In contradistinction to the rational mode of thinking which privileges univocity, correlative thinking involves the association of significances into clustered images which are treated as meaning complexes ultimately unanalyzable into any more basic components. In the Western tradition we are familiar with correlations such as those present in the humour theory of medicine, Pythagorean numerical correlations, Kepler’s correlation of the perfections of the trinitarian God, the world and the soul, and so forth (see Hippocratic medicinePythagorasKepler, J.). Astrological charts provide the most familiar illustration of correlative thinking. But, as may be seen particularly (although not exclusively) in the discussion of Daoist philosophy, correlativity is  not only an anthropocentric mode of signification. The Daoist notion of de – ‘particular focus’ or ‘virtuality’ – extends the context of signification to all phenomena (see Daoist philosophyDe).

Correlative thinking is the primary instrument in the creation, organization and transmission of the classical curriculum in China, from the Book of Songs to the Analects to the Yijing (see Chinese ClassicsConfuciusYijing). Perhaps the most overt illustrations of the Chinese resort to correlative thinking in the classical period are to be found in the period of the Han dynasty (206 bcad 220). During the Han period, vast tables of correspondences were employed to identify and organize the sorts of things in the natural and social world which were thought to provide a meaningful context for one’s life. One such set of tables, called ‘tables of five’, compared ‘the five phases’ (wood, fire, earth, metal, water), ‘the five directions’ (north, east, south, west and centre), ‘the five colours’ (green, red, yellow, white, black), ‘the five notes’, and so forth. Other types of correlation employed the twelve months, the twelve pitches, the twenty-eight constellations, the heavenly roots and the earthly branches. Such classifications include body parts, psycho-physical and affective states, styles of government, weather, domestic animals, technological instruments, heavenly bodies and much more.

One of the important devices for making such correlations is the contrast of yin and yang, literally, ‘the shady side’ and ‘the sunny side’ of the mountain (see Yin–yang). These notions were employed to identify alternative patterns of hierarchical relationship. The old teacher, Laozi, is wiser than his young student and hence ‘overshadows’ him in this respect. Laozi is yang and the student is yin. The student, however, is stronger physically than the old master, and hence in physical prowess the student is yang to Laozi’s yin. When these various strengths and weaknesses defining the relationship can be balanced to maximum effect, the relationship is most productive and harmonious. It is clear from this illustration that yang and yin are by no means to be understood as ‘cosmic principles’ or ontological contrasts rooted in the very nature of things. Rather, they are heuristics helpful in reading and characterizing the world as concretely experienced in a variety of ways.

Though the contents of many correlative schemata are often prima facie the same as the subject matters of the Western natural sciences, there is a crucial difference in the manner they are treated. In China, correlations were not employed as a means of dispassionately investigating the nature of things. Correlative descriptions are, in fact, prescriptions. Correlative schemes oriented human beings in a very practical manner to their external surroundings. Thus, the Chinese were concerned less with astronomy than with astrology; they were far more enthusiastic in the development of geomancy than geology. Science was always understood as ultimately subject to prevailing human values.

what the world must be like for science to be possible

from Larval Subjects (Levi R. Bryant), I thought this was an interesting insight to share (while reading up on object-oriented ontology):

... Bhaskar asks how science is possible and why, in particular, we must have recourse to experiment in science. As such, Bhaskar is engaged in a transcendental inquiry. However, what distinguishes Bhaskar’s transcendental inquiry so much from prior transcendental inquiries is that it does not have recourse to mind, culture, language, or the human in formulating its answer, but rather to the world. In effect, Bhaskar asks not what our minds must be like for science to be possible, but rather, in a jaw dropping and audacious move, what the world must be like for science to be possible. In short, if our science is to be possible– and since it is actual we know that it is possible –the world must be a particular way. And this way in which the world must be is intimately linked to the fact that we must engage in experiment in order to conduct our science.

Bhaskar outlines two general features that the world must have in order for 1) our science to be possible, and 2) to explain why experiment is necessary. Let us take the second question first. Why is experiment necessary? If the empiricists were right and all our knowledge originated in sensation then we would be hard put to explain why experiment is necessary. Here it is noteworthy that Kant fully takes over the empiricist line of thought which holds that knowledge must be grounded in sensation. Rather, if experiment would be superfluous, then this is because it would be sufficient to simply observe nature passively and link the appropriate sensations, whether through a priori categories as in the case of Kant or modes of association as in the case of Hume. No, if experiment is indispensable, then this can only be because objects do not manifest their powers or capacities under ordinary conditions. Objects do not manifest or “give” their powers under ordinary conditions. Rather, it is only under the highly structured and isolated conditions of the experimental setting that we are able to encounter– or better yet, dis-cover –the powers that lie within objects. As a consequence, passively given sensations are not the origin of knowledge. Ontologically, then, the condition under which experiment is both possible and necessary is only in a world where objects can act without manifesting their act in either nature or for a perceiving subject.

As such it is necessary to distinguish the being of objects from the manifestation of objects. While objects are acts, these acts are not identical with their performance in either nature (events where no humans are about to perceive them) or with their performance for humans. Rather, the proper being of the object is not its performance or manifestation, but the generative mechanism that serves as the condition under which these performances or manifestations are possible. As Graham Harman will argue– though in a very different theoretical constellation –the being of objects is essentially withdrawn or hidden. No one has ever perceived a single object, but we do perceive all sorts of effects of objects. Traditional epistemology has confused these effects with the objects themselves. Fortunately we do occasionally manage to cognize objects through a sort of detective work that infers these generative mechanisms from their effects; without, for all this, ever exhausting the infinity of a single object. At any rate, if objects were not withdrawn in this way, the practice of experiment would be unintelligible.

This leads to Bhaskar’s answer to the first question: What must the world be like for science to be possible? Note, this is not a question about mind or culture, but about the world itself, regardless of whether or not humans exist. Once again, knowledge is an accident of objects, not objects an accident of consciousness or cognition. If science is to be possible– and I would argue, if any human practice is to be possible –then the world must be structured and differentiated. The world must have joints or, as Harman puts it, the world must be composed of “chunks”. Why is this the case? Let us return to the question of experimentation and the conditions under which experiment is possible. We will adopt two possible hypotheses pertaining to the ontological nature of the world independent of humans:

1) As certain mystics and contemporary crypto-mystics would have it, the world is an undifferentiated One-All that is only subsequently segmented or partitioned into discrete beings by some form of human agency whether this be through cognition or language (in the case of language we might think of Saussure’s and Hjelmslev’s undifferentiated “sonorous matter”).

2) Entities are the sum totality of their relations to all other entities in the universe.

The first hypothesis is easily dispatched on two grounds:  read on ... (on Bryant's blog) ...  

Sheldrake on Lawless Nature

Rupert Sheldrake
 expressing views closely related to those of Meillassoux - although Sheldrake would, in Meillassoux's terms, be more of a "subjective idealist" (Sheldrake often refers to Bergson, and this idea of habit-not-law as the principle of nature reminds one obviously of Deleuze, difference occurring through repetition etc.)

Appearances are Deceiving

The last week i've been reading the biography on Christopher Alexander written by Stephen Grabow, and I bumped into a passages that for me clearly related to the issues raised in Meillassoux's discourse on correlationism. I won't go into what Alexander's life long project exactly was, but what is the main driver, is the search for a generative theory of beauty and a resentment of modern architecture. 

"The prevailing view is that beauty is just much cream on the surface of things, the final icing of the cake. Actually Herbert Marcuse showed in his analysis of the philosophical history of the term, that view was fixed in the second half of the eighteenth century, about the time that scientific rationalism began "whittling down" the content and validity of aesthetic imagination. According to Marcuse, the sensuous realm of beauty - the realm of feeling - became relegated to the icefields of metaphysics, and what remained was mere appearance of a thing - the way it looked. But perhaps even more devastating that this stripping away of the content of beauty was the implicit repression of its actual validity by the claims of subjectivism. The result that , today, the average person assumes that not only does beauty have to do with just the appearance of things (and therefore an extravagance, to be added or subtracted as funds permit), but that it is also "subjective," a matter of personal taste or preference, and cannot be meaningfully discussed. And in this they have been supported by important philosophers, critics, and even artists who have come to the same conclusion. In summarizing this state of affairs, Guy Sircello points out how indeed it is almost impossible to discuss the subject objectively:
We hear from one side that the very search for necessary and sufficient conditions [of beauty] is perverse; from another that it is reckless and irresponsible because it will take the mystery and splendor out of our experience of the beautiful; from another that in making such a search we lose integrity because we are merely aping "science"; and from another that in trying to put soft, aesthetic notions on the same footing as hard, scientific concepts we are being presumptuous." /  p. 20,21 

I wonder now, can realism and subjectivism coexist,  or, can empiricism and subjectivism coexist? if so, how?

Meillassoux and Olfactory Science

"But how precisely an odorant molecule is detected remains a mystery. 
As with the picture of molecular interactions that drives our understanding of enzymes and drugs, the very shape of odorant molecules has been assumed to be the way it is detected in the nose.In this scenario, molecules are seen to be the "key" that fits neatly into a detector molecule in the nose that acts as a lock."

This is the view being challenged now by the quantum-mechanical model. In the classic model of explanation (the one discussed in the quote above), the co-dependence of odorant molecules and 'detector'-molecules suggests a version of correlationism internal to science itself, whereas, unexpectedly, it is the quantum-mechanical model that would here be associated with a "mathematico-realist" conception of smell. Note that, in terms of the distinction Meillassoux invokes in the very opening of his book, the association here is one between the classical model and smell as "secondary quality" and the quantum-mechanical model and smell as "primary quality" - but again, the distinction here is internal to the realm of exact science as a whole, whereas usually the investigations of scientists are seen as being aimed at reducing secondary to primary qualities. The distinction, then, reproduces itself within science: the correlation haunting Nature herself.

Language; our transparent cage

In the reading group it came up that the language issue isn't really addressed by Meillassoux. Since language is instrumental in constructing our transparant cage, it seems that this is an important issue. That instead that ancestrality is what is before any consciousness, it should be before language ... or are consciousness and langue tied up together. Can one not exist without the other .... 

Anyway, i got curious about these questions, hence:

Feral Children
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Chomsky's position that the language faculty is hardwired in the brain, a product of biological evolution. and that what makes us human. 
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